When the Arab Uprisings began in 2011, citizens called for dignity, democracy and social justice. Instead of witnessing the birth of more pluralistic societies and stronger governance systems, the past years have brought the Arab region only renewed authoritarianism, conflict, and yet weaker state systems. The regional governance deficit is creating a striking underperformance of most Arab governments in political and socioeconomic development terms. To limit the damage of this downward trend, Arab governments must adopt a 2030 Vision of governance reforms to increase political participation and political freedoms, to ratify and implement international human rights conventions and transitional justice measures, adopt population policies that reflect the region's changing demographic realities, reduce poverty through economic reform and combat corruption. The 2030 Vision will ensure the region enjoys a new era of inclusive, accountable and effective governance and the consequent benefits for sustainable development.
INTRODUCTION
Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that, 'good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development' (UN 1998). Indeed, good governance is generally agreed to benefit societies across the board, from correct and efficient use of aid to effective resource management and consequent gains in growth and productivity. Good governance also advances political inclusiveness and builds trust in government institutions, hence securing the stability of the state and its ability to commit to development work (UNESCWA, 2015) . In light of the role governance plays in achieving development and as a worthy goal in itself; this paper will present the necessity for good governance in the Arab region, the current challenges to its implementation and the future of governance in the region.
There is no commonly agreed meaning of governance, but this study will proceed with an understanding of governance as the process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced (The World Bank 2015). Governance can be measured by analysing voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (The World Bank, 2013) .
The governance deficit in the Arab region is severe. Whilst the region is highly diverse and each country possesses its own unique socio economic reality, the similarities which exist between the countries go some way in providing a context for the governance challenges. These include (UNESCWA, 2014):
 Economic and political power controlled by few elites  Political economy shaped by external revenues, such as oil, aid or remittances  Economic opportunities rationed by connection rather than competition  Centralised states, dominated by the public sector and a weak private sector  A security state, with an extensive and fierce coercive apparatus  Demographic change and resulting youth bulges These points highlight the underlying absence of meaningful social contracts between states and citizens across the Arab region (Cammack & Muasher, 2016) . Indeed in a recent survey from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace only 4 of the 93 participants expressed satisfaction with their governments (Cammack & Muasher, 2016) , (see also figure 2 and 3). The problem of governance is particularly dire in those Arab countries in situations of conflict or transition, namely Libya, Syria and Yemen. In these states it is difficult to problematise governance challenges when little official form of governance exists.
The Arab region performs poorly on several of the World Bank Governance Indicators. 4 out of 6 of the World Bank Governance Indicators indicate negative linear trends for the region. As figure 1 demonstrates, the region displays a striking negative trend particularly in Political Stability, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability and Control of Corruption. 
Source: WGI, 2015
These governance challenges are problematic in and of themselves, but also indicative of a "striking underperformance of most Arab governments in political, economic and social terms" (Tisdall, Indeed, poor economic governance, corruption, cronyism, heavy centralisation and political instability all contribute to reduced economic activity, poor foreign investment, high market entry barriers, increased unemployment and reduced GDP growth (UNESCWA, 2014). Similar effects are felt in the social realm, government ineffectiveness contributes to poor provision of public services and hence reduced access to the consequent human development benefits. This can result in dissatisfaction and unrest (Brixi, Lust, & Woolcock, 2015) . Meanwhile highly centralised unaccountable governments and non-participatory political systems reduce the chances of democratic transition and increase political instability (Khatib, 2013) and extremism. In the above mentioned survey by the Carnegie Centre the vast majority of participants surveyed, 88%, attributed the lack of political pluralism in the Arab region as contributing to the extremist wave confronting the Middle East (Cammack & Muasher, 2016) .
A mixture of these socio-political and governance challenges provided the impetus to the Arab Uprisings of 2011 (Dalacoura, 2012) . Despite this movement's root demands for good governance, the state of governance after the uprisings has largely failed to meet the expectations of those who partook. Social inequalities remain unaddressed, democratic ideology peaked during the early uprisings and declined rapidly into wars of discourse. This has left many states struggling in an environment wholly uncongenial to democracy or good governance (Hinnebusch, 2015) . In Egypt, promised democratisation was lost in a bloody contest over the new political order and a resurgent authoritarianism (Bentivoglio & Brown, 2014) . In Bahrain a non-violent nationalist uprising was crushed by regime forces and in Yemen a negotiated transition was arranged, but political morass since 2011 has led to the flight of the president, political unrest and a humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile the removal of the authoritarian regime in Syria resulted in a civil war and dissolution of the country's social fabric. In Libya too, the removal of a highly centralised authoritarian leader unleashed forces which now threaten to tear the country apart. The resulting political and security vacuum in Libya has proven fertile ground for the growth of extremist groups (Salloukh, 2015) . In all these cases despite a popular call for democratisation and a frustration with the corrupt modes of government, the governance gap has only widened as a result of the events of recent years.
It is clear the Arab region is in urgent need of a vision that tackles its institutional, political, and economic challenges and proposes innovative solutions to the governance deficit in the region. This paper will assess the key challenges to governance in the Arab region, including political participation, human rights, transitional justice, demographics, poverty and inequality, financial planning and corruption. Priorities for action will be defined and recommendations made so that by 2030 the region may hope to enjoy a new era of inclusive, accountable and effective governance. To better outline a visionary path to conquer governance challenges, the paper moves away from the traditional geographic or economic country groupings distinguishing between countries and instead analyses countries through the prism of those affected by conflict, vulnerable to conflict and stable countries.
VISION 2030: PRIORITIES FOR CHANGE

The challenge of political participation
As Verba and Nie (1987, p. 2) define it, "political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take". Political participation can be formal, in the sense of voting for a political candidate or informal through use of social networks, underground political movements, and social movements to challenge the political order (Khatib, 2013) . Participation can be considered as narrowly as casting a vote or as broadly as the freedom to speak out, assemble and associate (UNWomen, 2005) . Ideally participation creates greater government transparency and accountability and hence improved economic and social policies for all strata of the population. The current chapter will analyse the existing challenges to political participation in the Arab region from prevailing political systems, to institutional barriers, motivation to participate in political activities and demographic barriers.
Political systems and modes of governance
Each different political system in the region, (see Annex) affords different channels, degrees and barriers to political participation. This section will move forward with an analysis of the current modes of governance in the Arab region and how these impact on political participation.
Four years ago the prevailing modes of governance in the Arab region, that of highly centralised authoritarian monarchies and presidential republics, was brought into question by the events of the Arab Uprisings and its demands for democracy, social justice and political freedoms (Dunne, 2013) . Despite these demands the region has seen a return towards authoritarianism and renewed restrictions on political rights and freedoms. Citizens have little and in some cases even less voice in running their country's affairs than before the uprisings (Muasher, 2016) . Only Tunisia has made a democratic transition (Freedom House, 2016) and even some concerns persist, the governing coalition is fractious, it has failed to implement economic reforms and the ruling party split a little less than a year into power, in part because of moves by the President to install his son as a political heir (The Economist, 2016b).
In Egypt political rights are fragile largely due to tactics such as marginalisation of the opposition, state surveillance of the public and unjustified imprisonments that have become the norm after the military counter revolution against the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom House, 2015) . Since taking power the Egyptian state has made moves to strengthen and centralise the authority of state institutions (Bentivoglio & Brown, 2014 ) whilst minimising political opposition and pluralism. This has been aided by a string of legal initiatives including the Protest Law which limits citizens' ability to protest, either by restricting freedom of assembly or by permitting broad definitions of terrorism, sabotage, or inciting violence. Other legislation, such as bans on politically affiliated groups on university campuses, have further clamped down on political expression. Political freedoms in Egypt have become weak and contained and any attempt to take political expression to the street is met with force (Bentivoglio & Brown, 2014) . A recent survey by Freedom House ranked political participation in Egypt at just 4/16 (Freedom House, 2015) .
In Jordan the pattern is similar with a continued tendency towards autocratic governance and a lack of commitment to genuine democratic reform (Freedom House, 2015) . Whilst in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings promises were made of parliamentary and electoral reforms, no timetable was defined for the former and whilst the latter was amended, only the margins were changed, with the core of the system unchanged (Gause, 2013) . Opposition to the monarchy and meaningful dissent is restricted, in June 2013 in response to protests, the Jordanian government shut down nearly 200 news websites and used state security courts, where there is no right to appeal, to try civilians for participating in protests (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
Similarly in Morocco recent years have seen a lack of commitment to reforms towards more participatory politics. Parliamentary reforms and constitutional changes were made though did little to limit the power of the King. Instead the reforms outlined an ambiguous role for the monarch and maintained his position as head of state and commander of the armed forces. The reforms amounted to more of a "tactical victory for regime stability than the beginning of real political reform" (Gause, 2013, p. 16) .
The Gulf's dynastic monarchs have an infamously poor relationship with political participation. Some responses to the Arab Uprisings were made, instance municipal elections were held in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The more prevalent reaction of the dynastic monarchs however was to involve security forces and to crack down on political dissent (Gause, 2013) . Thus the unsurprisingly dire statistics on the Gulf's political participation (see table 1 ). Source: Freedom House, 2015 Even in the region's more stable environments political participation remains mired. Lebanon has experienced a downward trend in political freedoms in recent years which has materialised in the Lebanese parliament's failure to elect a new president and its postponement of overdue legislative elections for two and a half years. This has left the country with a National Assembly whose mandate expired in 2013 and elections delayed until 2017 at the earliest (Freedom House, 2015) .
In Syria, Libya and Yemen space for political participation is largely marred by the ongoing violence, human rights abuses and consequent humanitarian crises. If and when elections do occur, for example the Syrian parliamentary elections in April 2016, they are too fractious an event to be considered legitimate (The Economist, 2016a) . Prevailing political systems and their methods of governing go some way in explaining the barriers to political participation in the Arab region.
Institutional and Political Barriers
Khatib (2013) raises several challenges to political participation in the Arab region including; the endurance of formal political institutions that benefit from sustaining the old political status quo. For example in Egypt, the military has played a decisive role in Egyptian politics in both the post-Mubarak and post-Morsi era, where they continue to encroach on civil society, exert political control and make it difficult for new political entities to enter the formal political sphere (Khatib, 2013) . Another challenge is the overlap between the political environment and the social and economic spheres, the Arab economic elite are often also the political elite which infringes on the neutrality of political decision making. Similarly on the social level, political institutions are often infused with sectarian or tribal politics which reduces the institutions' ability to serve the public good. Further threatening political participation is that, for countries in transition, as much of the Arab region is, the public often yearns for stability and security which attracts citizens towards voting for established political entities rather than emerging parties. This can lead to the entrenchment of traditional parties and limit the participation of new political entities (Khatib, 2013) .
Other hurdles include the fear and reluctance to permit certain ideologies a foothold in the politics of the Arab region. This is particularly notable with regard to Islamist parties. In Algeria an insurgency that continues until this day was unleashed as a result of the cancellation of an election that expected an Islamist victory. In Palestine, the population fell into a form of Arab authoritarianism due to a refusal to accept the victory of Hamas in a 2006 parliamentary election. Similarly the military coup in Egypt against the elected Muslim Brotherhood has led to an even more authoritarian and oppressive government today (The Economist, 2016b).
Motivation for political participation
There is a strong link in the Arab world between political participation, specifically voting, and personal economic circumstance. Blaydes (2008) argues that parliamentary elections are an important device for the distribution of rents, promotions and state resources to important groups, Lust-Okar (2009, p. 122) calls this "competitive clientelism". Such realities are harmful to the actualisation of democratic practice as those who have used clientelist networks in the past are more likely to vote than are individuals who have never been involved in clientelist networks (Tessler, Jamal, & Miguel, 2008) . In addition, people with low incomes are more likely to be targeted for patronage because their "votes are more easily bought and their reliance on state patronage is higher" (Blaydes, 2006; Texcur, 2008 
Demographic challenges
Beyond these institutional barriers to participation there are also population specific barriers including illiteracy, expense, lack of access to information and institutionalised gender biases (UNESCO, 2006) . The diversity of the population of the Arab region is also problematic as each group fears that rivals will capture the state, its resources and its monopoly of the use of violence (The Economist, 2016b). This means that whilst political opportunity is limited for many in the Arab region it is particularly difficult to access for certain groups including women, youth, ethnic and religious minorities.
All of this means poor statistics for formal political participation in the Arab region. Across the region just 61% of people surveyed say they have voted in the last 12 months or in the more distant past (Pew Research Centre, 2014). For countries in conflict political participation is a distant concern, and even for those in stable countries voting is not a given. In Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, national elections have not been held in five or more years (Pew Research Centre, 2014). These trends are disconcerting and have a negative impact on governance quality. Poor political participation infers a low level of government accountability and hence government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political management (Nekola, 2006) . As such the 2030 Vision for Governance in the Arab Region must provide counter measures against poor political participation in the region.
Governance challenges related to human rights
In their recent annual report, Human Rights Watch (2015, p. 1) globally reviews human rights issues at the country-level and emphasises the main governance challenge:
" The report singles out the emergence of ISIS, the wars in Syria and Iraq, the growing repression in Egypt and the unrelenting Israeli-Palestine conflict as major human rights challenges in the region. These challenges not only impact the countries directly involved but also spill-over across the whole Arab region. Seemingly aware of the fundamental role of human rights, policy-makers appear unable to translate the core human rights values into action. Despite significant revisions of a 1994 version, the "Arab Charter on Human Rights in its current form 17 as well as national de jure provisions on human rights are ideally included in the constitution (Melton, 2014) and it may be most effective in authoritarian systems with at least a modest level judicial independence that do not already a high-level of de facto rights protection  Corruption is generally associated with negative effects to human rights protection in all spheres and the "consequences of corrupt governance are multiple and touch on all human rights -civil, political, economic, social and cultural, as well as the right to development. Corruption leads to violation of the government's human rights obligation 'to take steps… to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the [International] Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]'. The corrupt management of public resources compromises the government's ability to deliver an array of services, including health, educational and welfare services, which are essential for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. Also, the prevalence of corruption creates discrimination in access to public services in favour of those able to influence the authorities to act in their personal interest, including by offering bribes. The economically and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately from the consequences of corruption, because they are particularly dependent on public goods." (OHCHR, 2014)
 In turn, "policies driving the anti-corruption agenda, development strategies and human rights protection are often rooted in similar or common principles, i.e. non-discrimination, participation, accountability, rule of law, freedom of information, and transparency. Integrating such common principles into development projects aimed at fighting corruption will have a positive effect on the affected population and their enjoyment of human rights" (Global Portal on Anti-Corruption for Development, 2014). De facto provisions on human rights  Correlating women's participation with corruption, researchers argue the higher the involvement of women in public offices the lower corruption as they less condone or are involved in corrupt practices, because: "First, women may be brought up to be more honest or more risk averse than men, or even feel there is a greater probability of being caught." Second, women, who are typically more involved in raising children, may find they have to practice honesty in order to teach their children the appropriate values." Third, women may feel more than men -the physically stronger sex -that laws exist to protect them and therefore be more willing to follow rules." Lastly, girls may be brought up to have higher levels of selfcontrol than boys which affects their propensity to indulge in criminal behaviour." (  The relationship between better womens participation and lower levels of corruption appears not universally applicable, a new theory (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2014) using data from 70 democracies tries to explain why women's representation is sometimes related to lower levels of corruption: " greater risk aversion has been observed in women, and ther e is evidence that voters hold women to a higher standard at the polls. We hypothesize that the relationship between women's representation and reduced corruption will be strongest in democracies with high electoral accountability: where corruption is not the norm, where press freedom is respected, in parliamentary systems, and under personalistic electoral rules."
In her comment on the Arab Charter on Human Rights, Rishmawi (2009) 
Transitional justice challenges
Transitional justice measures in the Arab region are necessary for the evolution towards democratic governance systems. Transitional justice refers to "the full set of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation" (United Nations, 2004, p. 4). With several countries in the region currently suffering from different forms of conflict, transitioning from autocracy to democracy and being perpetually on the brink of relapsing into conflict, reconciliation and transitional justice measures are key political development strategies. Tools to achieve transitional justice include: "(a) achieving accountability through the prosecutions of perpetrators; (b) revealing the truths behind victims" suffering through truth commissions; (c) designing reparation programmes, both material and symbolic, in an attempt to compensate for victims" suffering; (d) institutional reforms and awareness-raising, to avoid future violations" (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2013, p. 1).
In the past a number of countries in the region have used transitional justice tools to overcome political challenges, with different degrees of success (Table 3 provides an overview on most recent transitional justice challenges). Most countries in the region require a transitional justice agenda and need to clarify five crucial questions. The first is determining the means of prosecution and what to prosecute. Second, the recognition of the citizens' rights to learn the truth by objective learning mechanisms that are nationally owned and/or may involve credible third parties (e.g. UN fact-finding). Third, clarity on the form of reparation is required to constructively manage expectations of victims and to satisfy grievances without causing additional frustration. Fourth, transitional justice processes must be devised with concurrent deep institutional reform. Finally, the importance of extensive and intensive national consultations for lasting peace agreements. In addition the gendered impact of transitional justice measures need to considered (Dewhirst & Kapur, 2015) .
The main lesson learned is the crucial role of civil society in the process. An independent and empowered civil society can carry out numerous functions. Including: "(a) data collection and the dissemination of information such as victim testimonies, truth commission findings and reports; (b) ensuring media coverage of the justice processes; (c) collaboration, facilitation, and provision of advisory services to governments in transition; (d) tailoring reparation programmes to facilitate community healing, especially symbolic reparations; (e) advocating for perpetrators of human rights abuses to be held accountable and working against impunity; (f) ensuring that the voices of the victims and their families continue to be heard; (g) following-up on the transitional process to ensure that it is being conducted fairly, transparently and comprehensively (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2013, pp. 2-3).
The collaboration between the state and civil society lends credibility and influences the perceptions of stakeholders that they own the process. The sentiment of participation across all levels is particularly decisive in the review of the security sector during transition periods. Overall security sector reform as a component transitional justice requires a consolidated approach to rebuild the state's security sector that is thoroughly grounded in the (new) constitution of the respective country. For example, in the case of Tunisia (Roach, 2013) it is suggested that security forces report to a cabinet member and not directly the President to prevent accumulation of presidential power. The security sector especially in transition countries may also require capacity-building for a better understanding of the difference between their roles and responsibilities under democratic vs. authoritarian rule of law.
Addressing the governance challenge of rapid population growth
High population growth and weak economic performance are considered contributing factors of political instability (Urdal, 2004 (Urdal, , 2011 . Therefore, the 'Vision 2030' for the Arab region needs to include coping strategies to deal with quantitative (i.e. youth bulge) as well as qualitative demographic challenges:
"Changing age structures, combined with other demographic trends have exacerbated the challenges to governments, particularly regarding unemployment, underemployment and job creation.
[…] The number of youth more than doubled since 1980 and its share in the population is at an all-time high […] the absolute number of youth is estimated to increase by 12 million by 2025.
[…] The reduction of high fertility and increases in the working-age population can create opportunities for economic growth if the right mix of educational, health, and labor-market policies are in place. For Arab countries to reap the benefit from this "demographic dividend", employment generation must keep pace with the large number of job seekers, which has not been the case in the recent past." (Mirkin, 2013 , pp. 7-8). Egypt: "trials of former President Mubarak, his sons, and those officials immediately around him are centered on corruption. Addressing gross human rights violations that happened over the last thirty years remains a challenge. Despite demands by the Tahrir protesters for this file to be opened, only small steps have been taken in this direction." Libya: "the ICC has jurisdiction. Yet there is now much confusion about how to deal with one indictee for crimes against humanity, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, son of the late leader Muammar Qaddafi. Libya wishes to try him at home." Yemen: Amnesties are not permissible if they prevent the prosecution of individuals who may be criminally responsible for international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and gross violations of human rights. In a violation of this principle, the Immunity Law adopted by the Yemeni Parliament on January 21, 2012, purports to grant: (1) full immunity to Ali Abdullah Saleh, and (2) partial immunity to ''officials who worked with the President in the civil, military and security institutions of the state'' from criminal prosecution ''in relation to politically motivated acts performed'' by them, with the exception of ''acts of terrorism. ' Egypt and Tunisia: to date, free and fair elections (early on in the democratic transition, an ambitious gender parity law was introduced in Tunisia). The reform of the security service and the ministry of interior were among the main demands of the protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, In Yemen, the reform of the military was a main demand in Yemen.
National Consultations:
Time-consuming, meaningful public participation and broadbased consultations, with the inclusion of victims, youth, women, and traditionally marginalized groups, to allow sharing their priorities for achieving accountability and sustainable peace.
"While there are commendable and vibrant discussions in the region about transitional justice, these discussions are yet to be structured as national consultations" Libya: lack of public consultation during the drafting of the Transitional Justice Law contributed to misconceptions about its scope and content. Following the adoption of the law, seven out of ten persons (all judges and all men) appeared to have been appointed to the commission established under this law, without any transparent selection process. Yemen: draft Law on Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation was elaborated without consultations Source: Mona Rishmawi, 2012 While the region slowly transitions to lower population growth and fertility rates, the consequences of historically unaddressed demographic challenges continue to translate into low labour participation, including limited empowerment of women, while straining the environment and stretching infrastructure beyond its limits. This variation in the annual rate of population change differs strongly between the countries in the Arab region and among the country groupings of this report. Tunisia and Egypt have seen relatively stable population growth rates that will not change drastically until 2030, but the other countries considered vulnerable to conflict outbreak, Jordan and Lebanon, will see a recognisable drop in population growth (see figure 4) . Gulf countries, in particular Oman and the UAE, are expected to see a drastic decline in population growth rates by 2030 (see figure 6 ). Most interestingly, the population change rate in conflict countries is expected to remain stable at a relatively high level over the two decades to come (see figure 5) . Policy responses require an upgrade to the education systems (especially secondary education) as well as innovative approaches to employment generation.
Furthermore, urbanisation and housing concerns need to feature in national infrastructure planning to prevent the emergence of urban segregation and "slum-isation" which would be detrimental to citizen welfare (UN-HABITAT, 2015) .
Overall national governance concerns related to water, waste management, transport/mobility, crime/law enforcement, land tenure, social infrastructure, and urban legislation, among others, are an inevitable result of population growth as well as population displacement due to, for example conflict, and require an adaptive response from policy makers. Over the next decades policy makers in the Arab region need to address poverty rates and ponder the following questions: "(i) Which institutional reforms are likely to lead to a competitive (or at least a contestable) political system, where political competition among elites leads to centralised political power and thus more effective provision of maximum social benefit to the poorer classes? (ii) Which institutional reforms can improve the political cohesion of the poor, or as a corollary, can reduce the fragmentation of the votes of the poor (in a democratic framework), due to the impact of patron-client relationships? (iii) Which institutional reforms are required to improve bureaucratic capacity (and thereby policy implementation effectiveness) and autonomy?" (Lakshman, 2003) . Other examples include pro-poor subsidy reform. Food availability and food prices 20 provide a relevant example. Regional dependency on food imports is seen as playing an influential role in triggering the events of the Arab Spring, some Arab countries resorted to quick-fix subsidies to appease their populations (Ciezadlo, 2011; Zurayk, 2011 Reform of subsidies, especially on food and fuel, as called for by the IMF's conditionality criteria for financial aid have been called into question by regional NGOs due to their detrimental impact on the populations they are supposed to support (Sherry, subsidies are necessary, then they must be designed to pursue an inclusive, targeted, human-rights based approach with a clear schedule of phasing-out; 2) develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction 21 ; 3) involve the concerned populations in the political process and decision-making to foster participation and ownership beyond a patronising elite hand-out approach; 4) link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public accountability mechanisms.
Enabling efficient public investment
The difficulty of political transitions in the Arab region hinders an inclusive reform of the economic model across the region generally and in vulnerable and conflict countries in particular. Persistent macro-economic inefficiencies and a lack of structural reforms result in sub-optimal economic performance in terms of growth and labour market expansion. Some countries have started to implement reforms, but over the next two decades far-reaching initiatives are needed. In their recent analysis, the European Commission (Arroyo, 2014, p. 6) concludes seven categories of structural factors responsible for "disappointing economic and equity performance": "1. Fiscal policy deficiencies, including in particular, the existence of costly and inefficient price subsidy systems, the lack of modern and welltargeted social safety nets, tax systems that yield meagre revenues and are socially regressive, and states that are oversized and discourage private sector development but that, at the same time, are highly inefficient, leaving few resources for targeted social expenditure and public investment.
Deficiencies in the labour market and in the education systems […].
Deficiencies in the trade and investment framework […].
4. Financial sector deficiencies. Capital markets are insufficiently developed. Financial systems tend to be dominated by banks (often public banks), which devote a significant part of their assets to refinancing the government, contributing to the crowding out of the private sector. Also, there tends to be a low degree of access of Small and MediumSized Enterprises (SMEs) to finance [...].
5 (see table 8 ). Consequently, improving governance systems for public investments in infrastructure, education and health together with investments into improving the business climate and enhancing labour market conditions will have positive and durable development outcomes across the Arab region.
Table 8. Income distribution -Selected pillars of Justice and entry points for corruption Education outcomes
 Private schools' ability to pay higher salaries and thus attract better teachers -> high tuition compared to free public schools, which reduces accessibility for lower income groups (Cammett,  Corruption reduces the ratio of investment to GDP, while increasing the "level of integrity" within a country increases the net inflows of capital (Lambsdorff, 2003) Labour Market  Corrupt practices have direct consequences on labour market concerns ranging from the compromised ability of workers to freely associate and collectively bargain, reduced safety in the workspace and depression of minimum wage and hence reduced incentives to add value to production (Walsh, 2010) , (Lackó, 2004) . Infra-structure
Opportunity for corruption at all stages of large-scale infrastructure projects (Hawkins, 2013; Kenny, 2006) :  Project selection: diversion of resources from one sector to another, as well as selection of uneconomical projects due to kick-backs and patronage;  Planning stages: neglect of priority but voter catching, overstatement or misrepresentation of specifications to advantage certain bidders, as well as favouring "white elephant projects" over pro-poor projects, lack of oversight mechanisms in place, malpractice;
 Design: over-design, manipulation of timing and project plan to benefit particular suppliers, consultants, contractors, and other private parties. Bribe for favourable environmental impact assessment/planning proposal/approval, etc.;  Bid and contract signing stage: political influence, levy large rents on international businesses in return for government contracts, kick-back expectations;
 Construction: Provision of equipment or goods of lower then specified quality, non-transparent contract amendments and diversion of funds, and lack of record-keeping
Combating corruption
Finding strategies to combat corruption contributes towards achieving economic and social justice. While research often centers on the actions of individuals with power, corruption is not only a state-centric or elite phenomenon. It can be found at all levels in society and in all spheres. Corruption manifests in negative behavior 22 and negative outcomes 23 of behavior not in accordance with the individual's (and/or the institutions) rights, freedoms, duties and responsibilities. Corruption can be defined as the abuse of public office and/or private position (both in terms of actions and intent) for either direct or 22 E.g. preferential treatment or peddling influence, nepotism, fraudulent activities, misuse of financial resources, bribery and so on 23 E.g. government failure, market failures, biased allocation of welfare services, distorted business practices and so on indirect personal gain, which in turn can violate obligations of fairness and betray social trust. 24 Once the notions of fairness and trust permeate procedural rules and state administration there will be an effect on national income distribution. Corruption is neither functional for economic efficiency nor human development. However, under certain circumstances potentially relevant for the Arab region, an important distinction between moral and utilitarian judgment about corruption comes into play to explain behavior of individuals and institutions. For example, You (2007) argues that unjust rules in combination with weak institutions partially justify 24 The proposed definition expands on existing definitions (The World Bank, 1999; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004; United States Institute of Peace, 2010), for example the World Bank definition, which straightforwardly defines corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain" and UNODC detailing the origins of the word corruption as stemming "from the Latin corruptus (spoiled) and corrumpere (to ruin; to break into pieces)". corruption as a self-defense mechanism or last resort. The questionable argument can be found especially in societies that prioritise (economic) efficiency over justice (You, 2007, p. 11 In an uncertain institutional environment of the public sector, private actors might takeover functions of the state and control access to services. Their distribution may not be based on fairness or equity, but on group-membership or any deliberate criteria to differentiate allocation of resources. In order to significantly improve the ranking of Arab countries in the Corruption Perception Index by 25 Measuring the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 175 countries/territories around the world with a score: 0 = worst perception of public sector corruption to 100 = best perception (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results) 26 However and as discussed earlier, the role of religion or belonging to a sectarian group, however plays a role in distribution of welfare services (Cammett, 2014) .
2030, the "Vision 2030" path for combating corruption contains efforts to: 1) address confidence-building measures to strengthen institutions to remedy the "self-defense" argument in addition to increasing stability and predictability of law enforcement ; 2) strengthen formal justice frameworks and anchor anti-corruption principles in national legislation and set-up reliable and objective enforcement institutions to monitor their implementation; 3) address economic determinants of corruption, such as unemployment and slow economic growth by formulating and implementing inclusive economic policy measures.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Any development outlook for the Arab States benefits from being embedded in regional and international policy discussions. The timetable for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the key development framework is coming to a close and another set of internationally agreed upon development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) continues and expands the existing framework to guide development efforts, to measure achievements and to hold policy makers accountable.
With reference to addressing governance challenges the priorities are clear (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012, pp. 8-9):
 "Focus on strengthening institutions and human resource capacities at all levels, concentrating on parliaments, electoral bodies and related processes, the security and justice sectors, public services, and promoting coherence across institutions;
 Support a state-society compact and culture grounded in constitutionalism, access to justice, equality and human rights;  Assist public institutions to become effective, responsive, accountable and representative through e-government and other means, foster public sector capacities and public-private partnerships at national and sub-national levels, prevent corruption and promote the transparent and sustainable management of public goods and financial and natural resources;
 Support capacity for cross-sectoral, integrated and inclusive decision-, policy-and law-making, at all levels;
 Ensure the strengthening of citizen participation and civil society organizations' engagement, including through e-participation, to ensure accountability and transparency and better inform decision-making;
 Support transparency and the right to access information about public affairs, encouraging states to adopt and implement legislation ensuring broad access to information by the public, including through the use of mobile, social media and other appropriate technologies;  Strengthen the environment for an independent and pluralistic media, and ensure that the media serve the needs of society by reflecting a diversity of political views, cultures, languages and beliefs." Table 9 . Recommendations to foster political participation and inclusion
Stable countries Vulnerable countries Countries in conflict
Medium-term  Revisit existing political institutions and explore how citizens can contribute towards national development at the political, economic and social level  Redesign administrative processes and structures to change the way policy-makers and citizens interact and communicate  Revisit democratic and economic reform. Successful reform in some countries can act as a model to others.
 Reduce constraints and central control in the political space (e.g. over parties, unions)
 Allow the formation of civil society organizations, political parties and other forms of associations to enable formal participation in policy-making  Educate citizens about the roles and responsibilities related to electoral fairness and electoral participation (ie. representation is independent of "wasta")
 Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration  Improve access to information and foster a climate of constructive exchange of views, including independent and pluralistic media  Generally build the capacity for civic skills, in particular to support engagement of marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities)
 Encourage all forms of non-violent political participation: electoral, faith-based, civic and so on  Train and educate public administrators to understand their role as facilitators, partners and collaborators in the service of the population  Foster a climate constructive to political dialogue at all levels within society considering the criteria of freedom of speech  Train the ability to form viable political coalitions that benefit the country  Reduce constraints and central control in the political space (e.g. over parties, unions)  Create a safe environment for formal and informal peaceful activism  Address fears and lack of trust into political systems through increased transparency in decisionmaking and through active reconciliation across party lines  Leverage the dynamic of the broad "protest demographic" to involve a diversity of stakeholders constructively in political decision-making  Generally build the capacity for civic skills, in particular to support engagement of marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities)
 Improve access to information and foster a climate of constructive exchange of views, including independent and pluralistic media  Remove repressive control over freedom of speech and association and desist with the trial of civilians in noncivilian courts  Reform existing political institutions and explore how citizens can contribute towards national development at the political, economic and social level  Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration  Establish a "cease-fire" and/or a peace agreement to ensure safety and to enable negotiations  Allow transition dialogues to be as inclusive as possible and hold them to high standards of good governance  During periods of transition, channel deliberate and nondeliberate political activity to become a precursor for democratic governance instead of a continuation of elite-based systems  Create an inclusive political space and build/re-build capacities for civic skills involving also marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities)
 Allow the formation of civil society organizations, political parties and other forms of association to enable formal participation in policy-making  Rebuild institutions observing good governance criteria (e.g. transparency, accountability, voice)
 Leverage the fluidity of transition periods to redesign administrative processes and structures to change the way policy-makers and citizens interact and communicate  Strengthen the capacity to politically engage of marginalized groups (e.g. women, minorities)
 Improve access to information and fostering a climate of constructive exchange of views, including independent and pluralistic media Longterm  Continuously strengthen human resource capacities and participation  Continuously strengthen human resource capacities and participation  Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration  Continuously strengthen human resource capacities and participation  Set specific targets measuring the responsibility and accountability of the public administration 
Longterm
 Long-term commitments concerning the above recommendations for a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice need to build on progress towards the above short-and medium-term recommendations  Long-term commitments concerning the above recommendations for a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice need to build on progress towards the above short-and medium-term recommendations  Long-term commitments concerning the above recommendations for a state-society compact based on observation of universal human rights and effective transitional justice need to build on progress towards the above short-and medium-term recommendations 27 Implementation of transitional justice tends to be a short-term policy recommendation in the countries concerned as it paves the way for sustainable and inclusive development in a climate of political, economic and social stability. However, medium-to long-term demands on implementation from the countries emerge and -in addition to the recommendations of this report -to successfully navigate through periods under transitional justice regimes, the UN (2004, pp. [21] [22] proposes a comprehensive framework of recommendations. 28 Table 12 . Recommendations related to accountability, institutional reform, economic governance and combating corruption -specific to country groupings
Stable countries Vulnerable countries Countries in conflict
Medium-term  Implement public accountability reforms as part of overall poverty reduction strategies  Reform governance of state-owned enterprises  Subsidy reform needs to be anchored in a broader inclusive economic policy reform and if subsidies are necessary pursue an inclusive human-rights based approach to design targeted subsidies with a clear schedule of phasingout  Develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction, for example through participation in and learning from other countries in the open budget initiative  Link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public administrations  Implement public accountability reforms as part of overall poverty reduction strategies  Reform governance of state-owned enterprises  Subsidy reform needs to be anchored in a broader inclusive economic policy reform and if subsidies are necessary pursue an inclusive human-rights based approach to design targeted subsidies with a clear schedule of phasing-out  Develop a competitive political environment following public accountability standards in order to leverage available resources for poverty reduction, for example through participation in and learning from other countries in the open budget initiative  Link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public administrations  Do the groundwork for public administration reform during the transition  Already during transition periods link anti-corruption initiatives to poverty reduction strategies and ensure institutional reform of public administrations  Implement public accountability reforms as part of overall poverty reduction strategies  Reform governance of state-owned enterprises
Longterm
 …  …  Reform governance of state-owned enterprises Table 13 . Recommendations related to accountability, institutional reform, economic governance and combating corruption -generally relevant across all country groupings, but dependent on national context
Political Institutions
Mediumterm
 Allow dual citizenship and grant voting rights to the diaspora. This can encourage migrants to maintain ties with their countries of origin. Avoiding the constraints foreigners face on certain such transactions as temporary work and land ownership, through allowing them access to public services and social benefits would likely promote investment in their countries of origin  Mind the political economy of the transition process that is highly context-specific  Governments must define inclusive growth strategies through a broad consultative process that signals the first step toward a new social contract rather than relying on the advice of small groups of experts Longterm  Abandon outdated, ideological platforms and find new ways to package solutions to the challenges of creating jobs, ensuring economic mobility, establishing equality before the law, fighting corruption, and guaranteeing fairer and wider political representation  Promote educational policies that encourage pluralism, tolerance, respect for different points of view, and critical thinking  Develop real connections with the people, learning from Islamist parties that have built constituencies over decades by provi ding health, education, and other services  Convince members of the business community to more actively fund emerging political parties by demonstrating that a strong, independent, and stable party system is in their interests  Reduce the unsustainable emphasis on individual party leaders and personalities  Encourage the consolidation of political parties by focusing on "big-tent" politics
Rule of Law
Mediumterm
 Cadastres of all countries need to be enhanced and digitalized. Immovable private properties valued above a pre-determined threshold should be taxed  Frameworks need to be developed for land policy, including public consultation. The normative framework, including human rights and gender issues, law enforcement, access to justice, and recognition of customary land rights, and the institutional infrastructure for land administration both need to be reformed Long-term  The independence of the judiciary must be ensured, antitrust laws enforced and independent regulator legal frameworks strengthened Public Administration
 Governments need to commit to a real anti-corruption campaign  PFM reform strategies need to be adopted in countries where they have not as yet been established and notable gaps exposed by Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments must be addressed  The budget formulation remains fragmented in many countries, starting from the split between competencies of the ministry of planning and the ministry of finance. The authorities should focus on the following key priorities: (a) ensuring a unified budget process, including full integration of recurrent and capital budgets; (b) introducing a medium-term perspective to inform the annual budget; (c) presenting a comprehensive and clear budget; and (d) strengthening the links between policy and budgeting. Introducing a budget strategy paper at the start of the budget calendar could strengthen the linkage between policy priorities and budgetary allocations  Regional support initiatives could strengthen governance mechanisms, particularly in natural resource-based economies. Such initiatives as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Publish What You Pay (PWYP) could help the regional public and policymakers advocate greater revenue and expenditure transparency  Statistical offices and analytical capacity need to be expanded in order to provide more in-depth economic analysis. A number of core indicators, particularly those concerning work conditions and informality, are not available, and this data gap needs to be addressed Long-term  Governments need to commit to a real anti-corruption campaign while strengthening watchdogs and the relevant judiciary system Private and Financial sector
 The unfinished agenda of banking restructuring needs to be finalized through stringent and prudential regulatory and corporate governance frameworks being imposed, hard budget constraints and reputable foreign strategic investors being accepted  enhance governance efforts in the financial sector as increased bank competition as well as allowing foreign banks to enter domestic markets, stricter disclosure rules, a legal framework that guarantees the independence of central banks and stronger supervision powers will all help to deepen and stabilize the financial system  Credit concentration needs to be gradually reduced. Banks exposed to high credit concentration risk should ultimately be subject to additional capital requirements. State-owned banks should be regulated and supervised like private-sector banks  It is important to strengthen financial supervision and macroprudential assessment capacities of supervising authorities in the banking and non-banking financial sector. Cooperation and the exchange of information among different sectors or national supervisors need to be built  There is a need for operational measures in security market regulations that aim to increase competition as establishing caps on the size of allocated bids and opening non -competitive auctions to large public-sector funds to enhance control of debt among different types of investors
Longterm
 An open consultation process could be set up with the business community, and inter-agency coordination should be improved for more effective planning and policymaking  Horizontal industrial policies should be favoured over vertical policies as they tend to adjust more easily to changing economic conditions. The playing field must be leveled across industries, transparency increased, backroom politics discouraged, and steps taken to avoid the creation of privileged cronies that will lobby to maintain acquired privileges. Keeping in mind that horizontal policies suffer from collective action problems and are long term in nature Considering the set priorities and based on the previous discussions, the present chapter outlines key policy recommendations for the countries in the Arab region taking into account the ongoing process for post-2015 Agenda. The chapter uses three country categories (in conflict, vulnerable to conflict and stable) to highlight the governance challenges and the governance differentials. Depending on the individual political, economic, social and environmental context, the sequencing of policies may be very different, i.e. to stable countries with advanced economies in the region other policy priorities apply compared with conflict-countries. It also means that the funding requirements for implementing governance reform policies and available financial resources are largely different.
CONCLUSION
The Arab region suffers a serious governance deficit. Across state systems corruption is rife, transgressions against the rule of law are permitted and violations of various international human rights codes occur. Political systems lack accountability and plurality with minimal space for political participation. Economic governance fails to benefit the many, instead emboldening entrenched and traditional elite while neglecting to adapt to the changing realities of Arab demographics. In order to prevent major socioeconomic disaster in the face of this deficit, the 2030 Vision recommends increasing pluralism, ratifying and honouring human rights conventions, reforming labour markets to adapt to the changing demographic realities while simultaneously adopting population control policies, adopting subsidy reforms, banking reforms, increasing competition, increasing public accountability and implementing an anti-corruption campaign. Such efforts would go a long way to ensuring that the Arab region will profit from the development benefit associated with good governance.
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